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“There is something important in humanity,” said Balin. “I can-
not at present describe it.”1
                                    — T .   H .   W h i t e ,   The Book of Merlyn
“Are things getting better or are they getting worse?” Laurie Ander-
son asks in one of her songs.2 She asks the question because it is impor-
tant, but she also asks it to demonstrate that it is impossible to answer. If
we said, “Things are getting better,” we would immediately want to ask,
“In what ways are things getting better?” Things could be getting better
in some ways and worse in others. Suppose we catalogued all the ways in
which things are getting better and all the ways in which they are getting
worse. What then? Could we compare the goods and the bads and come
up with a judgment that, all things considered, things are getting better
rather than worse?
Take the question of whether the twentieth century was better than
the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw advances in medicine,
life expectancy, and technology, as well as the spread of democracy and
racial justice. It also saw the greatest violence the world has ever known,
two world wars, the nuclear bomb, and the Holocaust. How do we
“measure” the good and the bad? How do we “weigh” them against each
other? Can we do that? Suppose we said, “On balance, the beneªts out-
weighed the costs, so things got better.” If we could say this, would it
mean that the beneªts justiªed the costs? Would it mean that we would
do it again if we could? Would we have said something meaningful?
When we turn our attention to the multiple ways things can be good or
bad,3 it becomes evident that any summary answer to the question of
whether things are, on balance, better or worse will not tell us much of
anything we want to know. God, as they say, is in the details.
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In T. H. White’s The Book of Merlyn, King Arthur sits in his tent
preparing for his ªnal battle.4 The wizard Merlyn suddenly appears from
nowhere to teach Arthur his ªnal set of lessons. Merlyn turns Arthur into
various animals to help him learn how they see the world and what they
know. In one of these lessons, Arthur becomes an ant. He watches an-
other ant that seems to have a job to do but no idea whatsoever how to do
it: “It was inclined to rely upon a series of accidents in order to achieve
its objects.”5 Arthur wants to question the ant—to ask “why it did not
think things out in advance.”6 He wants to ask it other questions, such as
“‘Do you like being a sexton?’ or ‘Are you a slave?’ or even ‘Are you
happy?’”7 He ªnds that he cannot do it:
In order to ask them, he would have had to put them into the ant
language through his antennae: and he now discovered, with a
helpless feeling, that there were no words for half the things he
wanted to say. There were no words for happiness, for freedom, or
for liking, nor were there any words for their opposites. He felt like
a dumb man trying to shout “Fire!” The nearest he could get to
Right and Wrong, even, was Done or Not-Done . . . .
. . . .
    Later on, he was to discover that there were only two
qualiªcations in the language—Done and Not-Done—which ap-
plied to all questions of value.8
Both Laurie Anderson’s question and T. H. White’s parable demon-
strate the complexity of our values. We are interested in costs and
beneªts, but we are also aware that some costs and beneªts are hard to
measure precisely because they are not susceptible to quantitative analy-
sis. They are not susceptible to quantitative analysis because, fundamen-
tally, when we think about what we value, we are interested in something
more than measurement. We want to know something about the character
of the goods and the bads; we want to know in what way something is
better or worse. We need a richer description of things than one can fur-
nish through a language that reduces all terms of value to pluses and mi-
nuses. We need to think in terms of justice, dignity, fairness, equality,
democracy, respect, humanity. We need narratives to help us negotiate
complex moral quandaries. We need conversation.
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Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have gone to great lengths to con-
vince us to ignore these considerations and instead convert all questions
of value into questions of costs and beneªts.9 They want us to think only
in terms of better or worse. For them, the only legitimate goal of norma-
tive analysis is to promote “the well-being of individuals in society.”10 We
should try to make individuals better off and avoid social policies that
worsen their condition. Kaplow and Shavell want us to stop talking about
things like fairness and justice and turn our attention solely to the goal of
promoting human welfare.11 According to Kaplow and Shavell, there is a
method to analyze such questions—welfare economics.12 Welfare eco-
nomics aggregates everything anyone might value: “The welfare eco-
nomic conception of individuals’ well-being is a comprehensive one. It
recognizes not only individuals’ levels of material comfort, but also their
degree of aesthetic fulªllment, their feelings for others, and anything else
that they might value, however intangible.”13 These intangibles include
their “tastes for fairness.”14 Those tastes affect welfare because satisfying
them promotes well-being. However, Kaplow and Shavell argue that fair-
ness should be a factor only to the extent that it promotes welfare; it
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should not be an independent basis for choosing among alternative rules
of law.15
Kaplow and Shavell perceive two distinct advantages of welfare over
fairness as an independent goal for law. First, welfare values human
autonomy and equality because it takes individual preferences seriously
and does so in an equitable fashion.16 Welfare is premised on the notion
of a nonpaternalistic consumer sovereignty. Welfare economists deter-
mine what promotes human welfare by looking at what people want; they
do not judge whether people should want what they want.17 In addition,
because welfare analysis aggregates the preferences of individuals, it
counts each person equally.18 Social policies that promote the welfare of
human beings therefore promote both autonomy and equality.
Fairness, according to Kaplow and Shavell, does the opposite—it
treats the desires of some individuals as “better” than those of others and
gives undue power to those who accept favored values. Those who pro-
mote fairness and justice seek to impose their views of what is right on
others.19 For instance, a law banning racial discrimination in public ac-
commodations on the sole ground that racism is abhorrent elevates, with-
out proper cost-beneªt analysis, the desires of those opposed to such dis-
crimination over the desires of those who favor it.
The second advantage of welfare over fairness analysis is that, in
seeking to maximize human welfare, it takes into account everything
humans value.20 A law that is favored because it is fair may or may not
promote human welfare. If a law that is deemed fair promotes human
welfare, then fairness is a superºuous norm. On the other hand, if the
independent value given to fairness results in a law different than what
would result from welfare analysis, then fairness has decreased human
welfare and made people worse off.21
Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge that individuals have “tastes for
fairness” and that a law that violates widely held views of fairness might
make everyone worse off.22 Thus, they concede that tastes for fairness
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should be included in a cost-beneªt analysis. However, they do not con-
sider fairness to be a valid independent criterion for adopting a law or
social policy. Kaplow and Shavell value fairness only to the extent that it
makes people happy; they would never value fairness in and of itself.
Thus, to them, fairness is a second-class citizen in the marketplace of
ideas. It can only detract from well-being.
What types of fairness concerns would contradict welfare considera-
tions? Kaplow and Shavell essentially deªne fairness concerns as
justiªcations for legal rules that ignore the consequences of those rules
for human beings.23 Respect for human dignity, for example, may justify
a rule protecting tenants from eviction without a court proceeding en-
suring that the landlord is legally entitled to the eviction. Requiring the
landlord to use court-supervised evictions also ensures that the tenant has
sufªcient time to move. Kaplow and Shavell would argue that these types
of fairness justiªcations fail to consider all the consequences of adopting
the rule. Prohibiting landlords from changing the locks on the door and
throwing the tenant’s belongings onto the street may appear to help ten-
ants—but it may well raise rents, resulting in a lease term for which ten-
ants were unwilling or unable to pay. Fairness is therefore potentially
counterproductive. We scholars should forget about making our own
judgments about fairness and trying to introduce those judgments into
law, because the effort is likely to hurt the people we want to help.
Legal scholars have long subjected law and economics to a series of
internal critiques intended to demonstrate that the methods presented by
law and economics scholars are indeterminate in the absence of numer-
ous controversial value judgments that cannot be defended by economic
analysis itself.24 I do not want to restate all those arguments here. I do
want to respond to what is new in Kaplow and Shavell’s argument. In the
past, law and economics scholars have said that their conception of value
was a partial one.25 They sought to identify rules that promoted efªciency
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or welfare and claimed that we were entitled to sacriªce welfare to
achieve equality, distributive justice, or other goals if we so desired.
Kaplow and Shavell challenge this way of accommodating conºicting
values and argue that welfare is the only factor of importance. According
to them, legal academics who sacriªce welfare to achieve fairness have
acted both irrationally and tyrannically. I do not agree with this view, and
I want to explain why.
In Part I, I will explore what is at stake in the choice between what
Kaplow and Shavell have called welfare and fairness. I will argue that
fairness arguments are not and cannot be wholly nonconsequentialist in
nature, nor are they wholly non-aggregative. In certain respects, Kaplow
and Shavell attack a straw person. While Kaplow and Shavell have tried
to construct a sophisticated, comprehensive approach to welfare analysis,
they have deªned fairness in an overly simplistic manner—a manner that
no actual fairness theorist would accept. I will isolate what I see as the
real issues in dispute: (1) differences of opinion about the way one
should go about aggregating human interests, (2) how one decides when
to aggregate and when not to aggregate, and (3) the role that human
judgment plays and should play in legal and policy analysis.
In Part II, I will engage in an internal critique that accepts Kaplow
and Shavell’s general goals and assumptions while explaining why it is
not possible to engage in the form of argument they propose without re-
lying on the very fairness concerns they deplore. I will then move to an
external critique in Part III that does not accept their premise that welfare
is the only thing of value. I will argue that their defense of welfare de-
pends on several ºawed fundamental assumptions. I will conclude in Part
IV by arguing that we show respect for people by critically evaluating
their preferences rather than deferring to them.
I.   The Deªnitional Debate: How Kaplow and Shavell Deªne
Fairness Unfairly
Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal scholars should analyze whether
legal rules promote human welfare and should refrain from considering
whether the rules are fair (except to the extent that they enhance well-
being by satisfying tastes for fairness). What is at stake in the distinction
between welfare and fairness?
Kaplow and Shavell want to exclude fairness considerations from le-
gal analysis for several reasons. First, they criticize the non-consequential-
ist nature of fairness arguments, noting that fairness arguments purport to
justify protection of particular human interests without regard to the so-
cial consequences of adopting those protective rules.26 In fact, they argue,
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fairness concerns are counterproductive because they may harm people
instead of helping them.27 Second, Kaplow and Shavell are critical of the
non-aggregative nature of fairness concerns and are willing to consider
fairness only insofar as it reflects the views of fairness held by everyone
in society.28 Third, Kaplow and Shavell suggest that scholars themselves
generate the fairness problem by developing their own views of the fair-
ness of legal rules and giving those views independent weight when
choosing among competing rules.29 Fairness concerns are tyrannical, the
argument asserts, because they substitute the analyst’s preferences for
those of the very people whom fairness concerns are supposed to help.
So-called fairness concerns, according to this theory, interfere with peo-
ple’s autonomy to choose their own values and live their lives on their
own terms.30 Kaplow and Shavell would avoid this problem by requiring
that the analyst calculate, for every individual, the extent to which the
fairness of a given legal rule affects her “tastes” for fairness and aggre-
gate the resulting utility loss or gain for all members of society.31
Yet it is clear that many people, including many legal scholars and
even the framers of the Constitution, have given fairness independent
weight in legal and policy analysis. Although no one wants to make eve-
ryone worse off, Kaplow and Shavell insist that fairness theorists persist
in using a method of analysis that will often do just that. Why would they
do such a perverse thing? They must do so, Kaplow and Shavell assert,
out of habit, because no other discernible reason exists: “[W]e discover
very little basis for the use of notions of fairness as independent evalua-
tive principles.”32 Fairness proponents assume their views make sense or
unreºectively adopt principles of fairness because they are “internalized
social norms.”33 Kaplow and Shavell believe that such persons simply do
not understand “that promoting notions of fairness would make everyone
worse off.”34 This habitual inclusion of fairness concerns is contrary to
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Kaplow and Shavell’s belief that the scholar must subject fairness norms
to evaluation.35
Kaplow and Shavell advocate the views of utilitarians and conse-
quentialists in their long-standing debate with proponents of deontologi-
cal approaches to ethics and law. Their argument is simple and elegant
and, at ªrst glance, compelling. Who wants to make things worse rather
than better? Who wants to harm people rather than help them? Kaplow
and Shavell note that “on a general level” this argument “is in fact tauto-
logical.”36 They acknowledge that fairness theorists could incorporate the
consequentialist analyses they favor, so they deªne the kind of fairness
considerations they want to attack as not including such considerations.37
They believe that fairness arguments are very likely to make people
worse off; if we choose one rule over another because it is fair, we will
have failed to consider the consequences of choosing that rule. In short,
Kaplow and Shavell accuse fairness theorists of being simplistic. Fair-
ness theorists may believe a rule is fair, but if they do not consider the
consequences of adopting particular rules of law, they may not see that a
rule actually promotes unfairness by causing changes in behavior that
impinge on the very interests it was supposed to protect.38
I agree that legal scholars should think things through and consider
all the relevant facts before coming to a conclusion. I also agree that
scholars sometimes present simplistic fairness arguments. However, the
problem here is not fairness; it is the failure to consider the complexities
involved in the choice between alternative legal regimes. It is true that a
proponent of fairness may fail to take into account facts that she should
see as relevant, but this is also true of a welfare proponent.39
Kaplow and Shavell correctly note that some fairness theorists argue
that rules are justiªed because they protect interests that others have a
moral duty to respect.40 Such analysts have indeed failed to consider
competing interests, as well as the individual and social effects of
adopting a rule. But fairness theorists generally do not end there. They
recognize that the exercise of one legal right might clash with another.
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Fairness theorists are as aware of this as are economists and, when the
exercise of one legal right impinges on human interests protected by an-
other legal right, they seek to ªnd some analytical framework for decid-
ing which right will prevail.41 Therefore, no meaningful fairness argu-
ment can be wholly nonconsequentialist.
I agree with Kaplow and Shavell that fairness arguments can be
made in a simplistic and unpersuasive fashion. Judicial opinions are re-
plete with statements like the following: “I ªrmly believe that a land-
owner’s right to use his property within the limits of ordinances, statutes,
and restrictions of record where such use is necessary to serve his legiti-
mate needs is a fundamental precept of a free society.”42 The problem
with this argument, of course, is that the right to freely use and develop
one’s own property may have external effects on the property of one’s
neighbors. If the freedom to use property were unlimited, one property
owner would be privileged to destroy the property rights of others. It is
therefore commonplace that “the uses by one must not unreasonably im-
pair the uses or enjoyment of the other.”43 Rights of security often limit
rights of freedom of action. To take another example, our interests in
ºying airplanes safely and securely may require us to sacriªce our free-
dom to board planes without inspection of our baggage.
Fairness arguments can be made in a simplistic, one-sided fashion,
but this is not an indictment of fairness considerations. It is merely a
criticism of bad fairness analysis. Law professors devote much of their
course-time to teaching students how to argue on both sides of contested
cases by helping them understand each side’s legitimate interests. It is
inadequate for the plaintiff’s lawyer only to explain why the plaintiff’s
interests are important. She must either explain why the defendant’s in-
terests are not deserving of legal protection or argue that, even though the
defendant’s interests should be legally protected, the plaintiff’s interests
are more worthy of protection than the defendant’s in this particular case.
Moreover, fairness analysis is not the only method subject to poor
use; welfare arguments can similarly be made in a simplistic fashion.
Lawyers sometimes argue that a rule is bad because it has costs. But the
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mere fact that a rule has negative consequences is not a reason to oppose
it. Every rule has costs. The question is whether the beneªts are greater
than the costs. Or more precisely, the question is how the costs and
beneªts of the plaintiff’s proposed rule balance against the costs and
beneªts of the defendant’s proposed rule. Any analysis that focuses ex-
clusively on the bad effects of one of the rules is incompetent. Yet one
sees such arguments all the time, both in judicial opinions and in legal
scholarship.44
The reductionism of Kaplow and Shavell’s conception of fairness
extends to their doctrinal and theoretical treatment of torts and contracts,
where they fail to see that sophisticated fairness theorists acknowledge
that rights may conºict and that it is necessary to reach an accommoda-
tion between them when they do.45 Instead, Kaplow and Shavell suggest
highly simplistic conceptions of the legal and moral principles underly-
ing contract (enforcing promises or punishing promise-breaking)46 and
tort (compensation for harm or punishment for fault).47 I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t
rights theorists, for example, want to enforce promises because it is un-
fair to break promises and because people reasonably rely on them. But
most rights theorists oppose requiring someone to do what she promised
to do if she no longer wishes to do so, because rights theorists value in-
dividual liberty and think a person should have substantial freedom to
change her mind. This is why courts so rarely order speciªc performance
and instead force the victims of broken promises to mitigate their dam-
ages. The right to change one’s mind conºicts with the right to rely on a
promise, and rights theorists attempt to determine which right should
prevail, in what measure, and in what situation. Sophisticated fairness
arguments, then, are not wholly nonconsequentialist, nor are they wholly
non-aggregative. They take into account the effects of rules on the rights
and interests of all members of society.
What, then, is really the difference between fairness and welfare as
approaches to justifying legal rules? The difference is best illustrated by
considering how welfare and fairness analysts would approach the same
question. For example, imagine a policy requiring all U.S. citizens of
Arab descent to carry special identity cards. According to a recent sur-
vey, approximately forty-nine percent of the United States population
thinks this would be a good idea.48
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Given that Kaplow and Shavell argue that fairness should not be
given independent weight in normative analysis and that fairness counts
only as a preference,49 what would a welfare theorist conclude? A welfare
theorist would likely start out as an agnostic on the question, approaching
it from a detached point of view and asking whether the costs of such a
program would outweigh the beneªts. She would consider the “tastes for
fairness” of the population, as well as the long-term effects of adopting
the program and the possibility that, looking back on the program,
Americans might regret having made the choice to adopt it. But in the
end, according to Kaplow and Shavell’s theory, the answer would depend
on a prediction about the overall social effects of the program, including
public safety “beneªts” and “costs” associated with disappointed prefer-
ences for individual liberty. If it turns out that the beneªts outweigh the
costs, the program should be adopted.50
In contrast, a fairness proponent would likely start with a very strong
presumption against any such program and with a commitment to an out-
come that would ensure equality for the American citizens in question.
While both the views purportedly held by half the population and the
security concerns of the government would enter into the equation, a
policy that so severely challenged the equality and rights of a minority
group of Americans would require a compelling governmental interest
that could not be achieved through less restrictive means. The Supreme
Court has provided us with schemas that utilize just this kind of struc-
ture.51
Thus the debate between welfare and fairness is a debate about the
way one should go about aggregating human interests, how one should
decide when to aggregate and when not to aggregate, and the role that
human judgment plays and should play in legal and policy analysis.
II.   Internal Critique: Why Preferences Cannot Be Satisªed
Without Reasoning About Fairness
Kaplow and Shavell argue that scholars, analysts, and policymakers
should not favor a law simply because they believe it is fair.52 Fairness is
a matter of opinion, and others may well have different opinions about
the matter. The fact that people have views about the fairness of alterna-
tive laws is relevant only insofar as satisfying their fairness preferences
affects their welfare.53 Analysts should not make independent assump-
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tions about fairness; they should only attempt to aggregate the prefer-
ences of human beings, whether those preferences are based on self-
interest, fairness, or whim.54
This position is analytically incoherent because it is not possible to
determine whether a law will promote welfare (deªned as satisfaction of
human preferences aggregated in a suitable way) without making inde-
pendent assumptions about fairness. There are at least three reasons why
this is so. First, in justifying the use of welfare as the only proper goal
for normative analysis, Kaplow and Shavell actually promote a particular
conception of fairness. There is nothing wrong with this, but it does
mean that welfare analysis cannot be coherently distinguished from fair-
ness analysis.
Second, welfare analysis requires quantiªcation of human inter-
ests—or at least a method for measuring the strength and magnitude of
those interests. However, any such measurement would entail controver-
sial value judgments, premised on particular conceptions of fairness and
justice.
Third, it is not possible to add in “tastes for fairness” that people
happen to have without deªning those tastes. The principles that guide
moral conduct are often vague guidelines. Moreover, those guidelines,
already vague, often conºict with each other at the intersections of
difªcult questions. Therefore, determining what people think is fair in a
particular case requires the analyst to consider carefully how conºicting
norms should apply in that instance, and determining people’s tastes re-
quires the analyst to consider critically what the tastes would be if people
thought about the matter carefully. This, in turn, requires the analyst her-
self to think critically about the matter. She must consider what argu-
ments should convince people. As such, the analyst cannot defer to the
preferences of others without engaging in an independent analysis of
fairness and guessing whether, upon reºection, others would change their
views. This predictive question will turn partly on the analyst’s views
about the strength, coherence, and persuasiveness of those fairness con-
siderations. This process is dialogic—one whose very outcome is deter-
mined through the process of conversation—making it that much more
difªcult to predict.
A.   Kaplow and Shavell, Themselves, Conduct a Fairness Analysis
Kaplow and Shavell’s argument promotes human welfare as a goal
because it embodies a particular conception of fairness that they person-
ally favor. It appears obvious to Kaplow and Shavell that people are bet-
ter off when their preferences are satisªed—that is, when people are
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given what they want.55 Kaplow and Shavell want to satisfy preferences
because they believe people are the best judges of their own interests and
because they believe that satisfying preferences will promote both auton-
omy and equality.56
These are fairness arguments. Kaplow and Shavell rely on notions of
respect and equality to justify a system in which they would prohibit le-
gal analysts, such as themselves, from relying on notions of respect and
equality. Perhaps these arguments appear self-evident to Kaplow and
Shavell. They may believe that it is a truism that everyone will generally
be better off if they are able to choose their own ends and pursue them as
they see ªt. If Kaplow and Shavell’s conceptions of autonomy and equal-
ity were universally shared, they might require no justiªcation and could
be taken as useful premises. However, many legal theorists have different
conceptions of both norms.
Kaplow and Shavell assume that autonomy is promoted if individu-
als are given the freedom to choose their own ends. “Autonomy,” how-
ever, does not necessarily mean freedom of action or freedom from ex-
ternal restraint. This limited version of autonomy has been termed
“negative liberty” by philosophers, and it has long been contrasted with a
vision of “positive liberty” as the ability to achieve one’s own purposes.57
Although I am strongly in favor of autonomy, I do not conceptualize it to
mean that the law should maximize individual freedom of action. Like
Martha Minow58 and Jennifer Nedelsky,59 among others, I view autonomy
as establishing a context for human action. That context includes free-
dom to do what one wants and to shape one’s life, but it also recognizes
that human life is what it is because we do not live alone, but rather in
relationship with others, dependent on them. “What actually makes hu-
man autonomy possible,” writes Nedelsky, “is not isolation but relation-
ship . . . .”60 To determine whether individuals are “autonomous” in this
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view, one must discuss the relationships within which individuals are
situated. To do that, one must discuss the effects law has on human rela-
tionships and the effects human relationships have on law. More funda-
mentally, one must determine which relationships to foster and which to
suppress.
This does not necessarily mean that my conception of autonomy is
better than Kaplow and Shavell’s. It does mean that their argument for
welfare is premised on a particular understanding of fairness that they
have neither subjected to critical analysis nor justiªed as superior to al-
ternative notions.
As I noted earlier, Kaplow and Shavell are correct to condemn sim-
plistic fairness arguments. For this reason, their argument for welfare is
incomplete without a better defense of the fairness considerations on
which it is based. But, of course, they purport to eschew consideration
and evaluation of fairness norms. My point is that they cannot do so.
They themselves give independent weight to a particular conception of
fairness. Their argument, as a result, depends on the very considerations
they purport to banish from the policymaker’s and legal scholar’s toolkit.
B.   Purely  Quantitative  Analysis Is Impossible
The second problem with separating fairness and welfare is the
difªculty of quantiªcation. Kaplow and Shavell insist that their notion of
welfare is a comprehensive one. All values are included in the cost-
beneªt analysis, including such intangible factors as tastes for fairness.
Even if they do not assign explicit numbers to costs and beneªts, Kaplow
and Shavell try to assess their magnitude or strength. But it is not practi-
cal, or even possible, to quantify all the factors that might affect human
welfare.
What value should we assign to the loss of human dignity suffered
by those who are not allowed to sit at lunch counters because of their
race? What value should we give to those who want to preserve a way of
life based on apartheid? Kaplow and Shavell say that since we implicitly
assign values, we should do so explicitly. But how do we do this? How
do we assign numbers to these interests?
One possibility is to ask people how happy a particular legal rule
would make them. Obviously, such a query faces the most extreme issues
with regard to quantiªcation. Should we assign a number based on our
guesses about human interests and comparative valuations? There is no
way to analyze the strength of human interests without judging them in
some way. Suppose, instead, we ask people how much money they are
willing to pay to obtain, for example, racial segregation or integration.
Since the rich can afford to pay more, that measure of value places a
premium on the current distribution of wealth, giving greater votes to
rich people than to poor people. This has its own problems of justiª-2002] Something Important in Humanity 117
cation; before we could accept “willingness and ability to pay” as a basis
for quantiªcation, we would have to explain why it is appropriate to start
from the status quo distribution of wealth when multiple forms of unfair-
ness created that distribution.
Even if we were to accept the current distribution of wealth, we
would still face problems in quantifying “willingness to pay.” Consider
the offer/asking problem. It is well known, and accepted by Kaplow and
Shavell, that the amount one is willing to pay to obtain an entitlement is
often less than the amount one would have to offer a person to induce her
to sell or relinquish the same entitlement.61 To pick a number that indi-
cates the strength of a preference, we need to choose between offer prices
(those an individual would be willing and able to pay to buy an entitle-
ment) and asking prices (those an individual would be willing to accept
to sell an entitlement).
Kaplow and Shavell dismiss this problem as technical, dealing with
it in a footnote.62 The problem, however, is not merely technical. To pick
a contemporary legal problem, consider whether discrimination should be
allowed on the basis of sexual orientation. On this issue, it would be easy
to ªnd people on both sides whose asking prices would be inªnite. Ask
someone who has religious objections to homosexuality how much we
would have to pay him to get him to agree to sign a law prohibiting sex-
ual orientation discrimination, and the answer might be: “There is no
amount of money you could give me to get me to agree to promote im-
morality.” Ask me what you would have to offer me to induce me to favor
allowing sexual orientation discrimination in housing or employment and
I would say: “I will not agree to that proposition for all the money in the
world.” In this case, if we assign numbers by assuming an extant legal
rule and asking how much those who favor it would ask to give it up, the
answer is that there might be no sale either way.
Each of these problems in quantiªcation exists for the same reason:
there is something important in humanity that cannot be captured in
numbers. Consider a young woman deciding where to go to college. She
is your friend or daughter and wants your advice. She has narrowed the
choice down to two places: College A and College B. She is very
conºicted. The schools are different, but they both seem attractive in
certain ways and unattractive in others. How should she decide? It might
be a good idea to list the pros and cons of each choice. But what should
she do then? Suppose she looked at the list of pros and cons and assigned
numbers to each item on the list based on a guess about their relative im-
portance. Then she hands you the list and asks you to add up the numbers
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and tell her how it came out. Excitedly, you get a calculator and add up
the numbers. You ªnd the answer. “Congratulations! It’s College B!” She
looks crestfallen. What went wrong?
There was nothing wrong with making a list of pros and cons. The
problems were the way she chose the numbers and the fact that she
thought the way to compare the pros and cons of two alternatives was
simply to do the math. Her number choices did not quite capture the real
meaning to her of each of the relevant factors. There is no algorithm for
assigning those numbers.63 Moreover, it would have been better for her to
peruse the two lists and then to imagine herself at each of the colleges.
She might have considered how happy she felt with each choice and
whether she felt a sense of regret or longing for the other choice. She
might have considered what her life would be like at each place and how
that would relate to her conception of herself and her deepest values,
both in the present and in the future. What she needs to make a human
decision is an overall judgment based on full knowledge of what is in-
volved in the decision. Numbers do not do the trick.
Now one may think that law is not at all similar. Individual choices,
although informed by reason, involve emotion and indirection, while law
and public policy require reason alone. This is simply not the case.
Choices among alternative legal rules require the exercise of human
judgment.
In law, our choices rely in part on narrative. We tell stories. In the
O. J.  Simpson trial, the prosecution story was that all the facts pointed to
Simpson; we would not want him to get away with murder, would we?
The defense story was that some of the evidence was planted; if some of
it was, doesn’t that mean all of it could have been? And if evidence was
planted, does that not raise reasonable doubt? These competing stories
help us understand and articulate what is involved in the decision.
It is sensible to say that one should not mechanically follow one’s
ªrst intuition but rather should subject it to critical evaluation. One wants
to say that “all things considered” one choice seems better than the other.
But this does not mean that the best way to make a choice is by assigning
numbers and adding them up. We come to conclusions partly by adding
up costs and beneªts and partly by making considered judgments based
on alternative narratives. This is why judicial opinions do not merely re-
cite rule choices and analysis. Instead, they start with a statement of the
facts. They tell the story of what happened.
Even if one wants to analyze legal questions by assigning numbers,
it is not possible to assign numbers to human interests without making
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value judgments. Those value judgments, in turn, require discussion of
what should go into choosing the numbers. During this process, the ana-
lyst gives independent weight to her conception of what would constitute
a fair method of assigning numbers. Again, we see that welfare judg-
ments are not separable from fairness considerations.
Kaplow and Shavell implicitly recognize this. Although they empha-
size that “tastes for fairness” should be added into the equation, they do
not add such tastes into their actual examples. The reason is that it is
difªcult or impossible to generate a noncontroversial number for “tastes
for fairness.” The result, however, is that Kaplow and Shavell have as-
signed an effective value of zero to such fairness concerns. They insist
that empirical studies should be undertaken to deªne people’s tastes and
the prevalence and magnitude of such tastes.64 Whatever empirical analy-
sis would demonstrate, it would not show that tastes for fairness are val-
ued at zero. There is nothing in Kaplow and Shavell’s method that would
allow an analyst to pick a dollar value without making judgments about
the appropriate weight to give such considerations. To make those
choices, the analyst cannot simply defer to the preferences of others be-
cause the very problem she faces is how to determine those preferences.
To make such choices explicit would require discussion, analysis, and
thoughtful consideration. It would, in effect, require the analyst to give
independent weight to fairness and justice.
C.   People Make Value Judgments in Conversation with Others
The third problem that arises from making welfare determinations
without giving independent weight to fairness considerations is that peo-
ple come to value judgments through dialogue with others. Values are
formed at the complex intersection of conversations, upbringing, per-
sonal reºection, and communal mores. People’s value judgments can
rarely be quantiªed as simple yes-or-no answers. Fairness, after all, is
much messier and much more interesting.
If our goal is to understand what people’s true tastes for fairness are,
we need to engage in a process of discussion that may itself change what
people view as fair. This involves two departures from what Kaplow and
Shavell envision. First, it is not possible for legal scholars to rely on em-
pirical research because such research often neglects to ensure that peo-
ple had perfect information on the issues and thought about the matter
carefully. Second, we cannot determine what people would think if they
thought about the matter carefully unless we think about the matter care-
fully. It is not possible to determine and defer to the views of others on
fairness without engaging in an analysis of what arguments should per-
suade us about the fairness of those rules.
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For instance, how would Kaplow and Shavell calculate people’s
“tastes for fairness” with regard to a new law mandating full-body
searches at airports for all men of Arab descent between the ages of
ªfteen and thirty? One might conduct a survey to determine whether the
public favors the measure.65 Suppose it turned out that the majority was
in favor and that random interviews suggested that this view was strongly
held. Suppose it also turned out that minority views opposing the practice
were strongly held as well. I argued previously in a discussion of a hy-
pothetical law requiring Arab Americans to carry identity cards that it
would be difªcult to assign numbers to these types of interests without
engaging in value judgments.66 But the problem is even more pro-
nounced, because people’s views are not necessarily stable. It might be
the case, for example, that the recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon have signiªcantly affected public sentiments at
the end of 2001. Similar support for the internment of Japanese Ameri-
cans followed the attack on Pearl Harbor and war with Japan. However, a
half-century after World War II, it is generally believed that Japanese
internment was a huge mistake and a grave injustice.67
Can one predict that sentiments about racial proªling of Arab
Americans would undergo a similar shift in the future? One might hope
so. At the same time, this is a very complicated question. It is not pre-
ordained that the United States will retain its core values in the face of
terror. Determining whether people would change their minds if con-
fronted, after the fact, with the consequences of a discriminatory policy
requires us to consider what people might think if conditions were differ-
ent. This involves a substantial amount of guesswork. It also involves
judgments on the part of the analyst. The more it seems to the analyst
that people’s views are wrong, the more the analyst might be convinced
that they would change their views over time.
At the same time, assuming people would eventually come around to
the “right” answer belies a startling degree of naïveté. I suspect that a
conclusion that people “would” change their minds over time is actually
a conclusion that they should change their minds. Conversely, promoting
social welfare through an inºexible adherence to the current preferences
of the majority assumes that those preferences will not change. Either
way, the analyst must make assumptions about human nature, culture,
and the core values that bind and divide us as a nation. We could do so
implicitly, by assuming a set of core values, or we could do so explicitly,
by deªning core values and discussing what they mean for a speciªc
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situation. Explicit discussion would require consideration of fairness in-
dependent of particularized beliefs regarding current issues.
Another difªculty with quantiªcation is that people change their
views depending on the context and manner in which the question is
asked and the persuasiveness of arguments presented on the other side.
People may give a different answer depending on whether they are asked
a question at work, at a place of worship, or at home. They may even be
affected by the fact that the person asking the question is a pollster
whose phone call interrupted a quiet dinner. These factors do matter.
For example, consider the question of whether landlords should have
to go to court to evict tenants. When tenants stop paying rent without
cause, many landlords want the right to change the locks on the apart-
ment door and throw the tenant’s belongings out on the street. Because
the law and most lease agreements used to allow them to do so, Kaplow
and Shavell might conclude that both tenants and landlords preferred it
that way, perhaps to avoid the costs of litigation. Today, however, laws
almost everywhere prohibit this practice. Why do people favor these new
laws if they are not what people want? Kaplow and Shavell may believe
that tenants do not value this right more than it costs because they do not
bargain for it in the marketplace and there are no demonstrable market
failures involved here to justify overriding the market solution.
This analysis fails to acknowledge that there are distortions to the
market analysis. Market bargaining is biased against adopting rules that
establish minimum standards of fairness in market transactions. The
views of people expressed through legislation are as valid a measure of
“what they want and value” as is arm’s length bargaining. Kaplow and
Shavell might believe that the political process is biased because people
think they are getting something for nothing and do not understand the
costs of regulation; market decisions, on the other hand, require indi-
viduals to face the reality of scarcity and make trade-offs to determine
what they want given limited resources. However, in the market, we are
impeded from thinking clearly about what sets of rules are needed to cre-
ate basic standards of fair treatment. After all, if you have to pay for
common decency, you may well trade it off against other things. Kaplow
and Shavell may ªnd this to be a virtue.68 They are correct to suggest that
trade-offs must be made and that we should be aware of those trade-offs.
But the market setting presumes a baseline set of norms that constitute
the framework within which bargaining occurs. One appropriate setting
for generating those norms is the courtroom; another is the legislature; a
third is social interaction.
                                                                                                                             
68
   They seem to be arguing that such tradeoffs are sometimes necessary. See, e.g.,
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 1280 (“Citizens do choose to be governed by regimes
that sometimes punish the innocent rather than to live in anarchy . . . .”).122 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 37
The residential tenancy laws that outlaw self-help eviction are
justiªed partly because people want them. They are the law almost eve-
rywhere because legislatures elected by the people enacted them, and
they were formulated in decisionmaking settings that were just as appro-
priate as ex ante market bargaining. Kaplow and Shavell fail to under-
stand that a rational decisionmaker—or a legal academic—might con-
sider the elaboration of basic standards of minimum decency for market
transactions to be better worked out in custom, legislation, or legal schol-
arship than in ex ante bargaining. This does not mean that ex ante bar-
gaining is not a legitimate source of fairness norms; social custom is in-
formed by contracts and may contribute substantially to the development
of just ground rules.69 It does mean, however, that ex ante bargaining is
not the only legitimate decisionmaking procedure for determining what
people want and value.
Fairness and welfare are not wholly separable. Welfare judgments
depend on prior fairness judgments. Fairness judgments include conse-
quentialist considerations. It is therefore not sensible to argue that legal
scholars should refrain from making judgments about fairness. They can
do so only by refusing to reason at all.
III.   External  Critique: Why  Human Welfare Is Advanced When
Scholars Make Judgments About the Validity of
Human Preferences
Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal academics should not inject
their own values into normative arguments about the law because it is
inevitably tyrannical for them to do so and the result will only make peo-
ple worse off. Their entire argument, however, rests on one two-part
premise: the only way to make people better off is by increasing their
welfare or utility, and the only way to increase their utility is to give
them what they want. I fundamentally disagree with both assumptions.
A.   People Will Not Necessarily Be Better Off If We Give Them What
They Want
If we give people what they want in an effort to maximize each indi-
vidual’s personal utility, we may end up creating an unjust society that no
one would have chosen on her own—and in which everyone is worse off.
In a short story by Ursula Le Guin, a land called Omelas has
achieved (almost) perfect happiness.70 It has done so at the expense of
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one miserable child. Every adult knows that this child is imprisoned and
forced to lead a horrible life and that this child’s suffering is necessary
for the happiness of others. Every child, upon maturity, is taken to view
the unfortunate one and taught that grown-ups know that the good of the
many outweighs the good of the one. Yet, Le Guin writes, some people
ªnd they cannot live in Omelas. They walk away, not knowing where
they are going or what they will ªnd when they get there. They simply
cannot live in such a world.
Are they right to walk away? Is Omelas right to ªnd that the well-
being of thousands outweighs the imprisonment of one child? This is a
paradigmatic example of what separates welfare economists from fair-
ness theorists. The dilemma is routinely taught in college philosophy
courses and parallels the age-old debate between utilitarianism and
deontology. Let us assume that when we consider all factors affecting
welfare in Omelas—including “tastes for fairness”—every citizen (except
for the child) is made better off from the child’s imprisonment. In other
words, no one walks away. Moreover, these views are stable and will not
change over time. Nor are there any bothersome externalities; the will-
ingness to harm one child apparently does not translate into a greater
willingness of the citizens of Omelas to inºict suffering on each other.
Is Omelas really better off? I would say no. Kaplow and Shavell, I
believe, would say yes. Kaplow and Shavell might think that Omelas is
better off because there is only one victim and the welfare of the many
outweighs the welfare of the one. But I would say that Omelas is not
better off, because it has perpetrated a horrible injustice. Omelas has,
without a ªnding of fault, chosen to violate this child’s autonomy and
extinguish the child’s free will. Omelas has infringed upon the basic de-
cency owed to every human being. It has turned every person in Omelas
into an inhuman being. They have all become something they should not
be. They are all worse off.
Kaplow and Shavell might ask me, “Where are you getting this
from? Who are you to ignore the will and well-being of everyone?” If
(practically) everyone is better off, Kaplow and Shavell might say that
Omelas is better off. Here is where I disagree. Omelas has used an im-
permissible means to obtain a permissible end. It may be that someone
could generate a fact situation that would prompt me to agree that, horri-
ble as it may be, the torture of one child is justiªed by the need to pre-
vent even greater suffering of numerous other children. (Consider the
suffering created by wars waged in legitimate self-defense, in which
children certainly suffer unbearably.) The mere facts that the many out-
number the one and that the many ªnd nothing unfair about what they are
doing are not a sufªcient basis to conclude that Omelas has presented a
persuasive justiªcation for its systemic reliance on the sacriªce of one
child. Perhaps Kaplow and Shavell would agree with this assessment, but
if they do, they would have to give an explanation that departs, to a124 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 37
signiªcant extent, from their model. They would have to give up their
insistence that we give no independent weight to fairness.
B.   Reasoning About Fairness Promotes Both Autonomy and
Human Welfare
Should Congress pass a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in public accommodations, housing, and employ-
ment? How should lawmakers decide this issue? What advice should a
legal scholar give Congress? Some would characterize the issue as a
moral one, others as one of autonomy, others as one of equality, and oth-
ers, I suppose, as a question of economic efªciency. In answering such
questions, it is typical for legal scholars—as well as “ordinary folks”—to
engage in persuasive dialogue about what is just and unjust, right and
wrong. What is striking about Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis, however, is
that they deem it tyrannical for the scholar to consider which legal re-
gime is just, or what kind of society individuals should, all things con-
sidered, favor. Kaplow and Shavell seem to exclude the possibility that
the work of academics is to engage in the process of persuasion.
Kaplow and Shavell would disable legal academics from writing ar-
ticles designed to convince people that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is unjust because it forces people to live “in the closet”
and prevents them from forming the kinds of human relationships that
most people take for granted. They do not want scholars to give inde-
pendent weight to fairness. Yet ironically, Kaplow and Shavell have de-
voted a great deal of time and energy to the task of attempting to per-
suade others that their way of thinking is better than alternative ways of
thinking. If most people like to talk about fairness, then why are they
trying to persuade us to stop doing so?71 They think that we may be per-
suaded to change our minds. They do not want to give us what we want.
They want to change what we want.
Kaplow and Shavell do not avoid the problem of tyranny. The pur-
pose of their theory is to ensure that a rule is in the people’s best interest,
as the people conceive it. Yet their approach will often result in favoring
rules that differ from the results one would get by relying on most peo-
ple’s ordinary intuitions about what is fair. They think that if people
thought things through, they would not necessarily want what ordinary
views of fairness would suggest. If lawmakers followed this approach,
                                                                                                                             
71
   Note that Kaplow and Shavell do acknowledge a role for persuasion regarding what
people should want if people’s well-being will improve over the long run. See Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 9, at 1338 (“[A] long-run strategy designed to change preferences may
make society as a whole, over time, better off. . . . [H]owever, it is not appropriate under
welfare economics to use the law to shape preferences when individuals’ actual well-being
will not be improved as a result, but rather the analyst wishes to impose on society his or
her own view concerning what other people’s preferences ‘ought’ to be.”).2002] Something Important in Humanity 125
they would impose these rules on people against their wishes on the
ground that, if people thought it through, this is what they would want.
Thus, adoption of welfare analysis is no guarantee against paternalism.72
Kaplow and Shavell suggest that fairness theorists want to impose their
views on others. It seems that fairness theorists are not the only ones who
give independent weight to their considered judgments about what the
law should be. Welfare economists, like Kaplow and Shavell, seek to
promote a method of analysis that will often violate strongly held intui-
tions, and they want to immunize themselves from criticisms for doing
so. In the end, it may be welfare economists, not fairness theorists, who
imperialistically withhold relevant norms from the discussion.
I am in favor of judging norms. I see tensions between principles of
reliance and autonomy, fault and internalization, compensation and free-
dom from ruinous liability. I am interested in the incidence of acts of un-
fairness. I want to know what incentives rules create and whether a rule
that seems fair on the surface will backªre. I want to know how legal
rules affect behavior as well as the costs and beneªts of that behavior.
But I am also interested in talking about what kind of world we want
to live in. People’s welfare will improve when scholars and lawmakers
engage in conversation about justice and fairness. This conversation
should include consideration of what, on reºection, academics believe
people should think is fair, not just investigation into what people actu-
ally believe is fair or what they would think was fair if they thought care-
fully.
C.   We Should Not Reduce Our Understanding of Life into
“Costs” and “Beneªts”
Finally, we should not convert all our values into costs and beneªts
because, in doing so, we lose a part of what makes us human. Kaplow
and Shavell want to reduce our normative vocabulary to a rationalized
comparison of the costs and beneªts that are the consequence of adopting
one rule over another. Like King Arthur,73 I ªnd myself wanting to say
something other than “costs and beneªts” or “better or worse.” At the
very least, I want to be able to give a more complete story of what makes
a situation better or worse for me and for other people. I want to talk
about the reasons people might prefer one rule and not just whether they
prefer one outcome. I am persuaded not only by the direction and mag-
nitude of preferences but also by their causes and justiªcations.
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The limitations of Kaplow and Shavell’s model are best illustrated
by example. Consider the desirability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
through the lens of welfare economics. In other words, consider whether
the prohibition on racial segregation in restaurants and inns made things
better or worse with respect to people’s well-being. Kaplow and Shavell
have  created a normative and conceptual straitjacket that requires all
judgments to be described in terms of magnitude. They would begin by
deducing the costs and beneªts of prohibiting segregation, and they
would consider tastes for fairness, including tastes for racial equality and
racial segregation, only insofar as necessary to determine the relative
strength of competing interests and to assign them numbers. It is con-
ceivable that allowing racial discrimination would maximize overall
“welfare” (however that is quantiªed) since such discrimination has his-
torically beneªted the majority at the expense of minority groups. If that
were true, Kaplow and Shavell would oppose the Civil Rights Act of
1964, even if they themselves thought racial discrimination was unjust.
Indeed, their model could be used to revisit the entire Bill of Rights.
According to Kaplow and Shavell, the only legitimate questions for
analysts to ask are: “What do you prefer?” and “How strong is your pref-
erence?” The reasons individuals prefer one thing over another are
deemed irrelevant to the legal academic. Like the ant with whom King
Arthur interacts, Kaplow and Shavell have a two-word normative vo-
cabulary: better and worse. Other guises of their evaluative terms come
along—costs and beneªts, pluses and minuses, well-being and harm,
preferences and distastes. But in the end, the comparison between two
legal rules, like all other comparisons, is a comparison that can be ade-
quately described only by a sense of magnitude.
Kaplow and Shavell’s normative vocabulary largely banishes any
role for qualitative distinctions, and tastes for fairness are ultimately as-
signed a numerical value.74 Judgments are reduced to equations: does a
rule improve or harm “well-being”? There is no room in this analysis for
ambivalence, for judgment, for moral reºection.
“Better or worse” analysis, as Kaplow and Shavell use it, banishes
from legal scholars’ tool bag any consideration of what constitutes a just
society. The analysis that Kaplow and Shavell’s scholar performs consists
of amassing a list of the costs and beneªts of alternative rules, assessing
their relative value, and doing the math correctly. Multiple questions are
inapposite. We cannot ask, “What is the right thing to do?” We cannot
ask, “What is fair to everyone involved?” We cannot ask, “Which rule is
most compatible with our considered judgments about the ground rules
organizing a free and democratic society?” Judgment—in the sense that
“ordinary folks,” legal scholars, and lawmakers usually think of it—is not
part of the picture.
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But why banish judgment? Why outlaw constitutional analysis that
accepts the need to outline basic standards of justice and decency within
which individuals may pursue happiness? Why is that sensible, much less
the only rational way to think about things? Kaplow and Shavell criticize
fairness theorists for failing to give an adequate account of their views of
fairness.75 Yet nowhere do Kaplow and Shavell adequately explain why
issues like racial discrimination should be addressed from a standpoint of
agnostic detachment rather than engaged commitment.
Perhaps racial discrimination, like rape, is, in their words, a “pro-
vocative example.”76 But what kind of system have Kaplow and Shavell
provided us if it cannot speak to the most fundamental questions that our
society faces? Are the problems of race or rape unusual ones? Although
the question of sexual orientation discrimination is a current question on
the political agenda, Kaplow and Shavell would have scholars and poli-
cymakers be noncommittal about this fundamental question of justice, at
least until we have added up the costs and beneªts of allowing or prohib-
iting such discrimination.
Whatever choices Kaplow and Shavell would make on these and re-
lated questions, it strikes me that any analysis of such pressing issues
requires judgment. If we are going to make value judgments—at the very
least, those judgments necessary in identifying the values of individu-
als—Kaplow and Shavell are right to suggest that we should do so ex-
plicitly rather than implicitly.77 Articulating the judgments we make
means we need to consider narratives about what life is like under alter-
native legal regimes. We need a richer vocabulary, not an impoverished
one. We need, in other words, to think about justice and fairness.
IV. Something Important
In my conºict of laws course, I begin with a famous case from 1892
called Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll.78 An Alabama
employee worked for an Alabama-based railroad company on a train that
ran back and forth from Alabama to Mississippi.79 A fellow employee
negligently inspected the train in Alabama and failed to spot a defective
link between two train cars.80 The train left Alabama, crossed the border
into Mississippi, and the link broke, causing an accident in which the
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   Id. at 1345–46.
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employee was seriously injured.81 Alabama had abolished the fellow ser-
vant rule and enacted a statute authorizing an employee to sue an em-
ployer for vicarious liability for the negligence of a fellow employee.82
Mississippi retained the old rule that immunized employers from liabil-
ity.83 Which law should apply?
Although the case is simple, the issue is complicated.84 Today, courts
no longer view the issue as solely tortious or solely contractual. Instead,
they look at the justiªed expectations of the parties and the policies and
interests of the affected states. The case is difªcult because the sovereign
at the place of the contract has strong interests in regulating an employ-
ment relationship centered there, while the sovereign at the place of in-
jury has strong interests either in deterring negligent conduct and pro-
viding compensation for parties injured there, or in freeing employers
doing business in the state from ruinous and unjustiªed liabilities. It is
also hard because the employee could well have expected on-the-job in-
juries to be governed by the law of his home state when he was hired
there, and application of such a law would not unfairly surprise the em-
ployer. Conversely, the employer may have expected that its business ac-
tivities in Mississippi would be subject to Mississippi law and that it
would be entitled to compete in the Mississippi market on equal terms
with Mississippi businesses. The employee, similarly, would not be un-
fairly surprised that he would be exposed to the vulnerabilities, as well as
the beneªts, of Mississippi law once he chose to work there.
Kaplow and Shavell would approach the issue by trying to ªgure out
what rule of law would promote human welfare. They might do this in a
variety of ways. They might, for example, ask what rule of law the states
would adopt if they were gathered together in a constitutional convention
or in ex ante bargaining. What would the states seek in such a bargaining
situation? The states might seek to maximize the number of occasions in
which their own law would apply to cases that involved contacts with
their territory or people. They might also be willing to agree, in certain
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   The employer argued that the case involved a tort issue and sought application of the
traditional rule applying the law of the place of the injury (Mississippi) when conduct and
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voluntarily assumed. Id. at 807–08. To characterize the issue as contractual, wrote Justice
McClellan, “would be astounding to the profession.” Id. at 807. Forty years later, the
United States Supreme Court decided a similar case, Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clap-
per. 286 U.S. 145 (1932), overruled in part by, Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39
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cases, to apply the law of other states in order to obtain the right to have
other states apply their own laws in appropriate cases.
However, it is not obvious that determining what rule of law would
promote human welfare would be the states’ goal. They might instead
seek to develop a conception of federalism that attempts to allocate
spheres of government power based on particular views of what types of
issues should be controlled locally. In other words, they might seek not to
maximize satisfaction of state interests but to develop an idea of com-
ity—of deference to the ability of other states to regulate events centered
in those other states or which crucially affect their interests or values.
They might have an afªrmative interest in not maximizing application of
their own law. They might seek, instead, to defer to the interests of other
states in appropriate cases rather than solely to maximize the achieve-
ment of their own.
Still another view might adopt a particular substantive policy as pre-
sumptively applicable. The states might agree that freedom of contract
takes precedence over other issues so that regulatory laws should be
conªned to regulatory states, and an inability to keep all the conse-
quences of conduct within those states should free individuals from pre-
sumptively oppressive legislation. Conversely, states might adopt a sub-
stantive policy of protecting individuals from harm; after all, the most
basic reason we create governments is to protect our lives, and under this
view, if one cannot conªne harmful conduct or its consequences to a state
that immunizes the actor, then one will be subject to the regulatory law of
the state that imposes a penalty for engaging in harmful conduct. The
problem, of course, arises when two states reach opposite answers to the
question of which rule better promotes justice and welfare. Choosing a
baseline policy will privilege the powers of one state and its citizens over
those of the other.
It is not clear what the underlying policy of the ªeld of conºict of
laws should be. Conºicting and incompatible goals are possible. Choos-
ing an approach is a constitutional moment. It will structure social life by
structuring the relations among sovereign states. It will also affect indi-
vidual rights by determining when individuals are, and are not, entitled to
the protection of a particular state’s law. One could say: Choose the goal
that maximizes human welfare. But this answer is inadequate, no matter
how one measures or characterizes the components of human welfare.
This apparently simple choice-of-law issue requires us to choose among
incompatible and incommensurable goods, to set the boundaries of state
sovereignty, to determine the extent to which we are willing to sacriªce
our own interests for those of others and the extent to which we should
defer to the ability of someone else to say what will happen to us. It re-
quires us to determine the baseline levels of protection we want a federal
system to ensure. These matters require judgment.130 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 37
Of course, we want to adopt rules that will make us better off, but
that is not the only thing we want. We want to do well, but we also want
to do good. We want justice, and we want to be able to say that we have
constructed a society that promotes human welfare and treats individuals
with respect and dignity. This is something Kaplow and Shavell want as
well, but it entails something more than satisfying preferences. We do not
need theories that magically generate answers to human conºicts by ref-
erence to presumed rights, but neither can we live with a disinterested
acquiescence to whatever preferences people happen to have. We need to
talk about the conºicts that arise among our preferences. We need to tell
stories to help us confront the tensions we face between our desires and
our better selves. We need to talk with each other to understand what it
would mean to live up to our better selves.
People will be better off—their welfare will improve—if lawmakers
and legal academics exercise practical wisdom in judging between alter-
native legal rules and regimes. Part of what it means to judge wisely is to
think critically about the rules that are necessary to accord human beings
fair treatment. Deferring to the preferences of human beings is not the
only way to show respect for people. Indeed, deferring to their prefer-
ences will often show disrespect for people insofar as it treats them as
non-thinking creatures. It assumes that beliefs about fairness are not
something we can reason about and that people cannot be persuaded,
upon reºection, to change their minds. It assumes that people can make
up their own minds without engaging in conversation with others about
right and wrong. It assumes that dialogue about right and wrong is not
part of what it means to be human.
But there is something important in humanity—something that is
lost if we defer to preferences, no matter what they are. There is some-
thing lost if we do not consider peoples’ preferences for being treated
fairly and ensuring that others are treated fairly. Those preferences are
not mere data to add into the analysis. They are an independent reason
for adopting rules of law. If something is not fair, and we cannot say it is
not fair, it is going to stay unfair. People want those of us who think
critically about the law to judge preferences on the basis of the norms
that form the basis of their—and our—most cherished values. Even if
they did not want this, we would not be respecting them if we did not
think and reason and talk about what it means to treat human beings
fairly.